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When will "they" learn

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Contrasted with 121, part 135 regulations are poorly and ambiguously written, as is much of the case law available. POI oversight is almost laughable. This coupled with poorly trained pilots, (Don't take this personally, I'm not talking about flying skills) and the very nature of 135 business, creates a culture rife with latent pathogens that all contribute to the accident chain.


Poorly written?. They seem pretty clear to most who fly or have flown 135. Not sure where you come up with that from. Poorly trained pilots?. Yeah, I suppose the FAA folks just give all a pass no matter how good or bad the pilots may or may not be. Get real, if you are into accident investigation(s) and you are a safety consultant then you should realize very little fact was in the above. You have shady operators and you have good operators, don't group the two together nor attempt to state the regulations, pilot training, and POI's are the cause of the problem. As the above poster mentioned the reply was too long, seemed more personal opinion than anything else so lost interest after the first paragraph and did not continue.
 
LJDRVR said:
POI oversight is almost laughable. This coupled with poorly trained pilots, (Don't take this personally, I'm not talking about flying skills) and the very nature of 135 business, creates a culture rife with latent pathogens that all contribute to the accident chain.
Good post LJDRVR.
 
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food for thought...

The bulk of the fars in 135 clearly state most boundaries with an introductory statement such as:

"...No air carrier may __________________ and No Pilot may _______________..."

When these boundaries are encroached and/or breached by an air carrier, they may have the FAA crawling up their arse. When a pilot or flight crew does the same, they may have an airplane crawl up theirs.

It is tough to say "NO" to your employer while an ocean of pimple heads stand by at the ready, and willing to do your job for less money. As a matter of self-preservation, it has to be done. AND, our bretheren need to get each other's back, not stab it. When one makes a "no-go" decision, others need to approach the situation with caution and consideration for consequences (BIG PICTURE-SITUATIONAL/INDUSTRY AWARENESS) and impact of accepting a trip that another has turned-down. Yes, EVEN with the FRUIT LOOPS that annoy the pilot corps when they use petty squaks to ground an a/c or Cx a trip for personal gain. Support them corporately before management and then take them 'quietly' and corporately IN PRIVATE and counsel those individuals on the impact of their actions.

The pressure these days is immense and unjust as margins are tighter and companies are fewer. A house divided against itself will SURELY fall. So too, will this industry as Loss claims mount and coverages skyrocket. I have said this before in post mortum, we have to band together and prevent this kind of loss as it impacts EVERYONE in this industry. The ripple is felt in every maintenance, manufacturing, service and support provider. And this is just the financial impact. The human aspect of the families' loss that was preventable is too, immeasurable.

Anyone can be a "yes" man. The 'real' money is made with an occassional "NO". That is what these companies are paying for. They expect after 5,000 hours you have seen alot and gleaned alot. Certaintly, that total would expect to be greater hold a few cancelled trips, due to duty/flight limits, maintenance limits, weather limits and a rare 'personal' limit.

Nowhere in here have I admonished the crew in this mishap. Read twice then react, then read twice more before responding. Anyone can sit at their CRT and see the chain of events, the failure therein and point as to a cause. That is easy, for the outcome is known. Put yourself in the shoes of the flight crew 90 minutes prior to departure of the illfated leg. Consider the circumstances and acknowledge the chain of events. Avoid any similar chains in your own career as it progresses. Break the chain before it breaks you and once again we visit this board to talk about another preventable mishap if someone would have just said, "No".

100-1/2
 
Ace-of-the-Base said:
Have ANY of the factors you point to been the cause of an accident? Again, lots of blame, few facts. Ace

Sure, Downeast Airlines NTSB-AAR-80-5. (Part 135 to boot.) If you'd like more I'll post dozens. Your assertion is that only pilots are to blame for accidents. You're wrong, and it takes reading a little bit more than the probable cause paragraph of an NTSB summary to begin to understand what I'm talking about.

There is no short and succinct answer here. I think it's interesting that you jump all over the original poster for not knowing what he's talking about, suggesting he do some research, but you don't even bother to read my post because you deem it too long and poorly written. Whatever.

Here's one you're familiar with:
  • Aircaft company builds single-aisle twin that has a tendency to pitch up/roll-off in the neighborhood of V1 when the leading edge devices are contaminated. Operators complain vociferously to the manufacturer, who, in order to avoid liability and not adversly effect sales, largely ignores the issue with an obscure AOM bulletin.
  • Post deregulation start-up carrier grows rapidly from a warm weather DC-3 operator, to an airline flying this company's product into the northeast during winter. The airline's training department is a pencil-whipped joke, but the feds allow the expansion anyway.
  • Flight crew doesn't de-ice, fails to perform a visual inspection, and attempts takeoff with the engine anti-ice selected OFF.
Who's fault is it? The pilots were only the final link in the chain.
 
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LJDRVR, shorter, thank you.

Now, I still think your focusing on 121 (or scheduled 135). I don't need a dozen examples, just one for the causes you set forth in your first post. The original poster said that 91 legs after long 135 days were contributing to this rash of accidents. I still ask for examples. That is all. My whole point was that safety is not "them", it is "us". Pilots just love to say they work in an unsafe industry. Whose fault is that? Who can change it? Us!!

Ace
 
Yeoooow-ouch

Well, the discussion in flowing that's for sure!!! Lots of good points but far too much emotion in some to carry much water. I am not going to take anyone's personal attacks and attempts to define my motives based on THEIR reading and interpretation of my post personally... I stand by what I posted, it is based on my experience. I agree that is always easier to point the finger at someone else, but I also learned long ago that when I point one finger at someone, four remain pointed back at me--note my use of brackets in the title of the post around the word they-- it implies a certain degree of accomplice thus THEY really becomes US. The easy answer is that EVERYTHING rests on the PIC as the final authority to conduct flight. However, stubbornly holding to this allows other folks to escape responsibility and accountability for, well, lets just call 'em less than smart decisions, especially if the PIC just happens to miss something, and being human this is always a possibility. Many PICs obviously feel that they are super human by attaining PIC designation and therefore do not make mistakes. Some so take this final authority to heart that they become complete assses to all around them and become a destabilizing force in the cockpit and in their department. We (dispatch, managers, line service, maintenance, pilots) all have our parts to play, 'nuff said for now.
 
flyr4hire said:
Well, the discussion in flowing that's for sure!!! Lots of good points but far too much emotion in some to carry much water. I am not going to take anyone's personal attacks and attempts to define my motives based on THEIR reading and interpretation of my post personally... I stand by what I posted, it is based on my experience. I agree that is always easier to point the finger at someone else, but I also learned long ago that when I point one finger at someone, four remain pointed back at me--note my use of brackets in the title of the post around the word they-- it implies a certain degree of accomplice thus THEY really becomes US. The easy answer is that EVERYTHING rests on the PIC as the final authority to conduct flight. However, stubbornly holding to this allows other folks to escape responsibility and accountability for, well, lets just call 'em less than smart decisions, especially if the PIC just happens to miss something, and being human this is always a possibility. Many PICs obviously feel that they are super human by attaining PIC designation and therefore do not make mistakes. Some so take this final authority to heart that they become complete assses to all around them and become a destabilizing force in the cockpit and in their department. We (dispatch, managers, line service, maintenance, pilots) all have our parts to play, 'nuff said for now.
Flyr, nice sum-up. When put that way, I agree whole-heartedly with what you are trying to say. Safety is obtained by all parts of the flying company working together towards a common goal. The pilots ARE the last line of defense, and sometimes ARE the sole cause of the problem. But more common then that, an accident is something that could have been prevented by any number of people stepping in and changing the chain of events.

Keep your eye on safety and you will live a long, happy life in aviation as I have.

Ace
 
was there not a recent article in ProPilot that showed 135 accidents vs 91 accidents... Confusing the issue were some accidents put in the 135 camp were actually tail end 91 flights.
 

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