crw overrun transcript

[DrunkIrishman]

Which V1 speed was set, Flaps 8 or 20?

 

[Flyer1015]

Yikes. This crew is fried, and the CA sealed his fate with the admission of guilt on the CVR. Not to mention the numerous blatant violations of sterile cockpit. God have mercy on them. They are good people, I'm sure, but after the Colgan crash, everyone is going to come down hard on them. Starting with the FAA.

 

[Stifler's Mom]

Even if he didn't say a word on the CVR, downloading the diagnostics from the airplane would have discovered what happened.

I hope we can all at least learn something from this incident to prevent it from happening in the future.

 

[flygirlqt]

These guys are going to replay this in their minds at least once a day for the rest of their lives. Including the wanton running of their mouths which is going to crucify them both.

 

[svcta]

Even if he didn't say a word on the CVR, downloading the diagnostics from the airplane would have discovered what happened.

Be that as it may, the CA is clearly heard asking for guidance on what his story should be and what he should "admit" to. The thing that concerns me the most about this what happened after the fact. The CA essentially threw away all concern over anything but his own azz. There were things to be done even if neither knew what those things were in that particular case. The first thing Captain Courageous does is phone a friend and ask how to best save his own butt. Not to call the FA and tell her what's up, not to discuss an evac, nothing. The FO is apparently sitting there wondering what he should do and the CA left him to figure it out alone.

All this aside from the fantasy-island conversation about all the neato toys these two want when they grow up, chock full of "like" and even a nice dooooood, "I got so # up on Saturday". What kind of knuckle dragger just decides to throw that in to a conversation like it's some kind of worthwhile accomplishment? I'll bet he listens to a lot of Nickelback in his spare time.

I digress. . . This CAPTAIN had two crew members, tower controllers, and firemen that all needed him to be present and engaged. Not punting away his responsibilities on the cell phone.

 

[Beefy Botham]

deleted.

 

[atlcrjdriver]

From looking at the tech data this a/c reached just over 140kts when he aborted. Once the flaps reached 20 deg the NW actually popped off the grd. Simply put, panic set in once he heard the config warnings. Had he simply continued w/ flaps 8 or after the flaps reached 20 he would have been OK. The one thing that might save him is the immediate action item for T/O config wng is T/O discontinue immediatly. Thus he followed company procedure. Of course, the company NEVER intended for you to reconfig the a/c during T/O roll.

 

[booo]

From looking at the tech data this a/c reached just over 140kts when he aborted. Once the flaps reached 20 deg the NW actually popped off the grd. Simply put, panic set in once he heard the config warnings. Had he simply continued w/ flaps 8 or after the flaps reached 20 he would have been OK. .

The one thing that might save him is the immediate action item for T/O config wng is T/O discontinue immediatly. Thus he followed company procedure. Of course, the company NEVER intended for you to reconfig the a/c during T/O roll.

Nothing should "save" him, except my last point. Somewhere I saw that he was a Check Airman of some level and should have known better than others of the following:

1) He should have known better than to reconfigure on the takeoff roll. F/O calls 80 knots, 1 second later he responds "checked". 5 seconds later someone notices that the flaps are at 8 and not 20 degrees as briefed and selects flaps 20. The runway he was taking off on is up slope with with a hump, no view of the departure end and is relatively short, but barring an engine failure no obstacles to be concerned with, just relatively short, therefore flaps 20. Better than reconfig on the roll,a check airman should have known to just add 12 knots to V1/VR speeds bugged and rotated at that speed or if necessary, gently rotate at the fixed distance markers (last 1000 feet) and ride it out. Non event! In Charlie West if you clear the runway and the EMAS and the (amended) ALS system, you instantly have 400 feet more altitude due to the terrain.

2) As a pilot in the 200,and as a Check Airman, he should have known that he would would get a "config flaps" warning if the flaps were not at 8 or at 20. He made the decision to change configuration, and with 4500+ hours in type he should have known the consequences, "config flaps" while the flaps were in transit.

3) 8 seconds after the F/O calls "V1" we get "config spoilers". He has brought the power levers to flight idle, yet the fuel controllers lag (to protect the engines) have the the engine speed higher than 77.9% (?). The power lever position (flight idle/reverse) sends the spoilers up for the abort but the engines RPM are still above the threshold and give a spurious warning. He should have known not to abort above V1, and especially not on a short runway. 8 Seconds?

4) After the fact he has no idea what to do. The F/O talks him into shutting down the engines, no evac plan in state, he goes into CYA mode.

Has he not learned anything in nearly 10000 hours? Or was he brain dead? Fatigued? Yes the F word. They both had a light schedule for the week before, but they both had flown excessive hours in the previous year, and fatigue (CHRONICALLY TIRED) takes a lot longer to recover from than most think.

Bad decisions? YES. Why? Stupid or Fatigued? Your call!

 

[Rally]

I'm confused why did he get config spoilers?

 

[Abernathy]

Looking at the reports, here are some interesting timeline events:

- V1 was called at 16:13:21 and the "sound of engine RPM decreasing" was noted at 16:13:32? What was going on between V1 and 11 whole seconds later when he decided to finally slam the thrust levers back? 11 seconds is a long ass time during a takeoff roll. Sh** I've done entire takeoff rolls that last 11 seconds.

- 80 knots was called at 16:13:10, and 6 seconds later he fumbles with the flaps.

I feel bad for the FO. We're put in a tough position when we see Captains screwing up. Sometimes the bigger call is on the FO--when to intercede.